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ABSTRACT
The effectiveness of community development alone,
as a means for improving the conditions of the poor
and their environment, has been questioned by many.
Action for Boston Community Development, Inc. (ABCD)
the designated Community Action Agency for Boston is
one group which raises this question; the recent evo-
lution of ABCD's role in community development reflects
this agency's resolve to be involved in this process.
In the summer of 1979, ABCD is scheduled to re-
ceive a grant award from the Community Services Admin-
istration to design and implement a comprehensive com-
munity economic development program in the Boston
neighborhood of Mattapan.
This thesis is designed to determine the feasibil-
ity and viability of ABCD incorporating community eco-
nomic and development activities into its program op-
erations, and the structural role that it should adopt
in this area, considering its traditional role as a
human services agency.
Phillip Clay, Associate Professor
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INTRODUCTION
In 1961, the Mayor of Boston, his Development Ad-
ministrator, members of Boston's civic elite, and po-
litically prominent people created Action for Boston
Community Development, Inc. (ABCD), an agency which
was later to be designated as the community action
agency for the City of Boston. Since 1961, ABCD's
role in community development has been an evolving
one influenced by its clientele and its primary fund-
ing source, the federal government.
The demands which have been made on ABCD by these
two groups have seldom been in accord. Its clientele
have pushed for a combination of human service programs
and economic development programs; the federal govern-
ment maintained that the two types of programs were
best delivered by separate agencies.
In 1979, ABCD is scheduled to receive a grant
award from the Community Services Administration to
design and implement a comprehensive community econom-
ic development program in the Boston neighborhood of
5
Mattapan.
This thesis is designed to determine whether
ABCD is capable of incorporating community economic
development activities into its program operations,
and the role that it should adopt, considering its
traditional role as a human service agency. This de-
termination will be made by considering four elements:
1) the goals of ABCD,
2) the resources of ABCD,
3) the resources of Mattapan, and
4) the needs of the residents of Mattapan.
Community Action Agencies can be a strong resource
for community economic development activities. If
ABCD is successful in its endeavors, there is a strong
possibility that the agency will receive additional
funds. The structural role that is adopted by ABCD
can have a great impact on the development of the
community, the agency's short and longterm goals and
its chances of receiving additional funds. The infor-
mation provided in this thesis should provide a guide-
line that ABCD can follow to determine its best strat-
egy. The design of this task is as follows:
The first chapter will examine the evolution of
the role of ABCD in community development. The rela-
tionship between ABCD and the federal government has
been one in which each has been influenced by the
other, and each of their roles in community development
6
has been shaped, in part, by this contact. The roles
o f the two in community development will therefore be
integrated in the examination. Current perspectives
on community development will be discussed in the in-
troduction to Chapter I.
Chapter II will examine the experience of ABCD
in community economic development. This chapter will
also include a brief section on the role of the feder-
al government in this field. The reasons for this
inclusion are two-fold:
1) The federal government has been the primary
funding source for the community economic
development movement, thus rendering the
movement heavily dependent upon the govern-
ment's fund; and
2) The way in which the federal government has
promoted community economic development has
had a direct bearing on the role of CAAs in
this field.
Current perspectives on community economic devel-
opment will be discussed in the introduction to Chap-
ter II.
The third chapter examines Mattapan, the proposed
site for ABCD's community economic development activi-
ties. This chapter is divided into two sections. The
first section documents the prevailing demographic,
economic, and housing conditions in Mattapan. The
second section cites the concerns of the residents
regarding their neighborhood, and the responses of
both the residents and the city government to these
conditions.
7
Chapter IV cites alternative structural roles
that ABCD can play in Mattapan and examines the capa-
bility of ABCD to play the roles. The chapter con-
cludes with this author's recommendation for the role
that ABCD should play in the economic development of
Mattapan.
8
CHAPTER I
9
Introduction
As a discipline, community development is rela-
tively new, having been recognized after World War II.
As a concept, however, the roots of community develop-
ment are firmly embedded in the social development of
this country. The geneology of community development
is attributed to a union between economic development
and community organization. That is, it is believed
that community development combines the emphasis on
local action and local resources that characterize
the community organization field, with the emphasis
on planning and systematic movements toward defined
goals that one finds in the economic development field.'
There is no single definition of community devel-
opment; rather, the term has been defined in a variety
of ways depending upon the position and the perspective
of the viewer. Social scientists in the field have
cited four forms in which community development can be
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defined: as a process, as a method, as a program and
and a movement. The forms are not mutually exclusive,
nor are the distinctions between the four precise.
However, the relative importance given to these forms
by social scientists in this field makes a brief dis-
cussion of them appropriate within the context of a
discussion on community development.
As a process, community development refers to the
developmental stages traversed by a community as it
moves from one condition to the next. In one author's
view, community development as a process refers to
"the progression of events that is planned by the par-
ticipants to serve goals they progressively choose."2
In this regard, strong emphasis is placed on what hap-
pens to those involved in or affected by community
development efforts.
As a method, community development is viewed as
a set of procedures, or techniques for meeting an end.
The strategies used can range from imposition, to self-
determination. As one author states
Central planners, economic developers,
and those representing some one pro-
fessional field may look upon community
development in terms of whether it will
or will not help them achieve the con-
crete material goals they have in mind...
The process is guided for a particular
purpose...3
The emphasis in this case is on the end result.
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Community development can be used as a program
when content is added to sets of procedures. It is
within this context that the broad notion of community
development becomes focused on special areas such as
health, recreation, education and the like. The empha-
sis here is on "accompanying sets of activities which
can be quantified and reported."4
Finally, as a movement, community development is
viewed as a spontaneous "crusade" or a cause which is
5
emotionally charged. For the purpose of this chapter
community development will be defined in the context
of the interpretations of the federal government and
the community action agency (CAA), Action for Boston
Community Development, Inc.
From the perspective of the federal government,
community development refers to federal efforts to
improve the environment and living conditions of all
citizens. This perspective was espoused by both
Presidents Johnson and Nixon when speaking of their
community development efforts. According to the Brook-
ings Institute, federal policymaking for community
development had four basic concerns:
1) Physical improvements of the urban
environment;
2) Improvement of the social aspects of
urban conditions;
3) Improvement in the performance of local
government; and
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4) Increased participation by local residents
in making decisions that affect their own
communities. 6
The evolution of federal community development policies
has been marked by a somewhat circular pattern. The
first series of community development programs began
in 1949. These programs concentrated on the physical
aspects of neighborhoods, and gave little attention
to the participation of low-income persons. The dis-
turbances of the mid-1960's jolted the federal govern-
ment out of its physical improvement program mode. It
was during this decade that the federal government,
made efforts to integrate physical improvement programs
with social service programs, and made steps toward
increasing the participation of low-income persons.
The last federal community development policies
discussed in this thesis reflect a regression toward
earlier policies which strongly emphasized physical
development strategies and deemphasized the participa-
tion of low-income persons.
In contrast, the role of ABCD in community devel-
opment followed a path which was more linear. Its
definition of community development shifted in the
mid-1960's, but the basic tenets of the revised defi-
nition have remained the same since that time.
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The term community development first appeared in
federal legislation in the Housing Act of 1949, Title
I, which was captioned "Slum Clearance and Community
Development and Redevelopment." The ultimate objective
of this act was to provide a decent home and suitable
living environment for every American family. The pre-
amble of the act stated that
The general welfare and security of
the nation and the health and living
standards of its people require hous-
ing production and realized community
development sufficient to remedy the
serious housing shortage, the elimin-
ation of substandard and other inade-
quate housing through the clearance
of slums and other blighted areas...
The program met its goals of "...a decent home
and suitable living environment for (some) American
families," but only at the expense of thousands of
low income persons. In a history of federal programs,
Frieden and Kaplan stated that the critics discovered
that "the cities were using urban renewal to refurbish
the central business district, build housing for middle
and upper-income families, and to bolster their proper-
ty tax. Inevitably, the locations designated for
urban renewal formerly housed low-income persons. Few
of the previous residents were able to return to the
"renewed" neighborhoods since the housing commanded
rents which effectively priced them out of the market.
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The urban renewal program was, at least for the
poor, an ineffective program. It was a program of
extreme opposites. Urban renewal.aggravated rather
than improved the conditions of slum residents; de-
creased rather than increased the amount of housing
available to low and moderate income persons; contri-
buted to rather.than prevented racial polarization;
disrupted rather than fostered neighborhood community
development; demolished more structures than it con-
structed; and began more projects than it completed.
Despite the negative ramifications of the urban
renewal program, there were those who continued to
endorse physical improvement programs. Policymakers
were fond of physical rehabilitation programs because
the results were more easily measurable than social
programs. Business and trade unions that were related
to the construction industry were fond of physical im-
provement programs because of the potential benefits
they could gain from such activities. Local officials
were fond of this approach because they felt that such
activities would increase the tax base, and enhance
the aesthetic quality of their localities. The offi-
cials hoped that a visually attractive city would en-
courage upper and middle income people to return to
the city. With such a large and influential support
group pressing for physical improvement programs, it
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is not surprising that the government continued to
enact and fund programs which focused exclusively
on physical improvements.
In 1955, the federal government introduced a pub-
lic works program. This program, legislated as Title
II, of the Housing Amendments of 1955 provided loans
to local governments. These loans were to be used in
financing projects such as street improvements, con-
struction or improvements on buildings other than
schools, recreation facility upgrading/construction
and other public works projects which were not eligi-
ble for aid under other federal agency programs. In
keeping with this physical orientation of community
development, Congress later added section 706 to the
Housing Act of 1961. Under this provision, cities
received grants for beautification projects that were
targeted for public places.
In Boston, an urban renewal program that was im-
plemented in the neighborhood of the West End in 1958
resulted in the displacement of thousands of low-income
9
residents when over 9000 dwellings were razed. The
replacement housing that was built in the West End
consisted of high-rise luxury apartments. This action
not only aroused the anger of those who had been dis-
placed, but also that of the City Council of Boston.
The'legacy of the West End experience influenced
16
the behavior of subsequent city administrations and
was responsible, in a large part, to the creation of
ABCD.
The Origins of Action For Boston Community Development
After coming into office in 1959 Mayor John Collins,
successor to the Administration which had perpetrated
the damage in the West End, found himself torn between
wanting to renew the central business district of Boston
in a way that would appeal to bankers, realtors, down-
town businessmen, and middle-class residents, but which
would not raise the ire of the City Council. It was
feared that recalcitrant council members could cripple
the entire renewal program. Compounding Mayor Collins'
dilemma was pressure from the Housing and Home Finance
Administration which required that local renewal
agencies supply evidence of citizen participation in
their planning processes. To circumvent potential
problems, Mayor Collins, his Development Administrator,
and representatives from two social service agencies
in Boston created an organization which would promote
the human side of urban renewal. In 1961, Mayor Collins
appointed the first full-time staff of ABCD and charged
them with the responsibility of determining the course
10that the new organization would follow. The staff
was comprised of 10 people who were members of the
social-service, business, academic and civic sectors
17
of Boston.
During the early months of operation the organi-
zation's activity was geared primarily to the develop-
ment of citizen participation in urban renewal. In
1961 citizen participation in urban renewal meant
citizen support of urban renewal activities in Boston.
ABCD hired community development specialists and as-
signed them to urban renewal designated areas for the
purpose of promoting this support. However, these
specialists encountered strong opposition against
urban renewal from local residents in these areas.
ABCD found itself in the uncomfortable position of
either organizing against the Collins administration,
its source of public funding, or challenging the auton-
omy of affiliated local groups.
In 1962, ABCD received a grant from the Ford
Foundation through the Gray Area's Program and the
organization shifted its primary emphasis from community
development to social service planning and program de-
sign. Although the primary financial support for ABCD's
early efforts was provided by the Ford Foundation, other
funds soon flowed from the President's Committee on Juven-
ile Delinquency and Youth Crime. However, neither this
source nor the other provided guaranteed permanent finan-
cing, but instead allocated funds based on a competitive
proposal'review system. And, the continuance of ABCD's
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funding depended upon its ability to design programs
that satisfied the requirements of its funding sources.
The composition of the staff, and board of ABCD
remained basically the same until late 1962 when di-
rectives came from Washington that the ABCD board be
broadened to become a "microcosm" of the community.
ABCD's chosen definition of microcosm was community
power structure. The board of ABCD was expanded to
include 35 "politically prominent people, and wealthy
business persons with broad civic interests.,,12 There
were no representatives from Boston's low-income popu-
lation on the board. As a result, the planning pro-
cesses of the board have been described by one critic
as an "effort of 'experts' to articulate goals for an
entire community of which they are not a part., 1 3
This definition of microcosm was not challenged
by the Ford Foundation or the President's Commission
on Juvenile Delinquency. Although both assumed that
substantial change would not occur unless the target
people themselves are involved in the action, involve-
ment can have a range of meanings. As one evaluator
stated
involvement and participation by 'the
target people' are highly ambiguous
goals, of course, and the foundation
--like everyone else--favored them if
they meant merely that programs should
.reach their targets and affect the
people they were aimed at, but any more
radical interpretation of these phrases
was foreign to the Gray Areas Program.14
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Neither the Delinquency Demonstration Program nor the
Gray Area Program were meant to be experiments in resi-
dent participation. The purpose of the programs was
to encourage localities to construct proposals based
on social science theories and to test their validity.
The aim of the program was to benefit the entire com-
munity while producing measurably visible effects.
Although its clients were the disadvantaged, as a semi-
public, semi-private organization, the constituents of
ABCD were vague and elusive.
The combination of these circumstances: the lack
of a defined constituency; the lack of permanent finan-
cing and assured status within some established insti-
tutional hierarchy; and the need to design programs
which would produce measurably visible effects created
an environment in which ABCD became opportunistic, and
used community development as both a method and a pro-
gram. Their emphasis was placed more heavily on exe-
cuting activities that had been determined by the 'ex-
perts' , in keeping with the goal of satisfying the Ford
Foundation and benefiting the entire community, than on
its disadvantaged clients.
In 1964, with the passage of the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act, the Community Action Program (CAP) was
created, and ABCD was designated by the Mayor of Boston
and the Boston City Council as the official CAA. ABCD
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was thus formally charged with the responsibility of
".. .opening to everyone the opportunity for education
and training, the opportunity to work, and-the oppor-
tunity to live in decency and dignity."15 The Economic
Opportunity Act grew out of the federal government's
intentions to:
* Redirect and coordinate government to con-
centrate on the most pressing social needs;
* Explore and promote innovation in meeting
these needs; and
* Allow those affected by the resources to
determine their own needs and contribute
to the planning.
Soon after its enactment, the Community Action Program
received a large amount of federal support. Federal
expenditures were reported at $237 million in fiscal
year 1965 and $628 million in fiscal year 1966.16
And, by 1965 more than 500 CAAs across the nation had
been funded.
The first director of the Community Action Program,
Jack Conway, was a strong advocate for a balanced re-
lationship between the three local interest groups that
had to be involved in community action: public offi-
cials, private agencies, and representatives of the
17
poor. Despite its new form as a CAA, and the posi-
tion of the national CAP director, ABCD made no efforts
toward achieving such a balance until 1965. During
this year local civil rights leaders represented
21
themselves and their low-income constituents as a force
that was determined to "end planning for people and
with people and begin a program whereby the people can
plan for themselves." Concommitant with the demands
made by community groups, throughout the nation, many
persons were protesting vehemently for the prohibition
of further urban renewal efforts, a program which had
fully embodied the statement "planning for people and
with people."18
Academicians and researchers alike had produced
works which supported the allegations of the people
that the urban renewal program merely exacerbated prob-
lems of the poor. Finally in the face of such litera-
ture and reports, in combination with the visible re-
sults of the program, even public officials who sup-
ported the program admitted that the urban renewal pro-
gram failed miserably as a program for eradicating slum
conditions in this country. As Norman V. Watson, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Management
was later to admit:
It has often been said by our critics
that we have been responsive to the
relocation needs of project residents.
It has been said, for example, that
urban renewal is nothing more than
Negro removal. It has been said that
we consider relocation as no more than
a hurdle which must be overcome to im-
plement the urban renewal plan, and
that we pay scant attention to reloca-
tion practices. We have been accused
of violating the law and of contraven-
ing our own administrative regulations.
22
And today we are being called 'legal
lawbreakers.' It is time to be honest
with each other and to admit that
there is some validity to these alle-
gations. 1 9
These circumstances could not help but give valid-
ity to those demanding changes in the composition of
the board of ABCD. As a result OEO delayed the funding
of ABCD programs until the Board or Directors adhered
to the "maximum feasible participation" clause of the
Economic Opportunity Act. In acquiescence the Board
released 23 of its old members from duty and added 22
new members. The majority of the new members were
chosen at public meetings held by community organiza-
tions at the local level. At the end of this trans-
formation, the revised Board had a significantly larger
number of blacks, civil rights workers, and persons
from low-income families. The reconstituted Board es-
tablished a decentralized system so that services would
be delivered at the neighborhood level.
To create local community institutions, ABCD de-
veloped the Kennedy Family Service Center in Charles-
town, and the Roxbury Multi-Service Center. Neighbor-
hood Legal Service offices sponsored by ABCD were, for
the first time, located in low-income residential neigh-
borhoods under the name -Boston Legal Assistance Project
(BLAP). Through the joint efforts of ABCD, the resi-
dents of'Columbia Point, and Tufts University, the first
comprehensive Neighborhood Health Center in the nation
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was developed in Columbia Point. Publicly funded family
planning services were offered to the residents of Bos-
ton in cooperation with City Hospital. In addition,
community action multi-service centers were organized
in eleven Boston neighborhoods by ABCD, known as Area
Planning Action Councils (APACs); pre-school Head Start
centers in collaboration with concerned parents and
community leaders were created in twenty-seven neigh-
borhood locations; and Neighborhood Employment Centers
(NECs) were opened throughout the city. The APACs were
constituted as non-profit corporations which maintain
their own board of directors, composed of residents of
the community, the majority of whom are elected by their
neighbors.
The idea of community development efforts that
promoted maximum participation to the extent of self-
determination, and the mobilization of the poor through
a government financed program was not favorably received
by many officials, civic elite, or intellectuals. One
member of Boston's civic.elite observed that "letting
the poor run the poverty program seemed as foolish to
him as sending his children to a school run by children."2 0
And, a well-known sociologist wrote in the New York
Times Magazine in 1966 that:
It is a grand spectacle, not simply
of democracy at work, but of democracy
trying to stimulate the response that
makes it work better. The danger is
24
that the degree of social order
that any social system needs will
be undermined.21
In addition to protestations by civil rights advocates
regarding the CAP program, a group of mayors also regis-
tered complaints about the program during that same
year. The latter group, however, protested that CAAs
were mobilizing the poor against them and therefore
working to the detriment of city hall functions. The
protests of this latter group were given greater weight
by President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey and
resultantly attempts were made to reduce the role of
the poor in policymaking. In addition the CAP budget
was severely cut by the President.
The negativism that was directed toward the CAP
influenced the citizen participation aspect of the
next broad-based federal community development program
--Model Cities. In addition, the inability of the
Model Cities program to implement its key strategies
ultimately affected later developments in the role of
ABCD in community development.
The Model Cities Program
The resigned recognition of the inadequacies of
the urban renewal program contributed to the disillu-
sionment and growing disenchantment that was felt by
many about the federal government's inability to effec-
tively address problems of urban decay. These feelings
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were expressed, in part in critical essays, by protest
marches and demonstrations. They finally culminated
in rioting by those who had suffered the most from the
government's ineffectiveness. These activities served
as an impetus for the federal government to resume its
efforts to design a program which would be efficient,
effective, and produce visible signs of improvement.
As a result of these efforts, in 1966 Lyndon B.
Johnson, President of the United States, presented the
Model Cities program. This program was an attempt to
address and make up for the shortcomings and the fail-
ures of past government attempts to eradicate the prob-
lems of neighborhood and urban decay. And, unlike the
CAP which was viewed by some as an "advance guard for
the overthrow of local establishments," Model Cities
was intended to create government and partnership be-
tween residents and city government.22 Because of its
design, the success of the Model Cities program depended,
in a large part, upon the ability of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to implement three
strategies: the coordination of federal programs which
affected model neighborhoods; the concentration of re-
sources in designated poverty neighborhoods; and the
mobilization of local leadership to achieve active
citizen participation in the target areas.23 HUD felt
that coofdination was needed to insure that any programs
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with the potential to affect the model neighborhoods
would be complementary to the activities of the Model
Cities program. HUD therefore wanted to create a
means through which these programs would be subject to
review by its delegate agency, the City Demonstration
Agency (CDA), and to approval by the local executive
of the participating city. Of the three agencies
whose activities HUD sought to coordinate: the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), the Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL), and the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity (OEO), none were of assistance to HUD. Neither
was HUD successful in implementing its concentration
strategy. This strategy would have resulted in concen-
trating a large amount of money among a small number
of specially chosen areas. In actuality, Congress de-
creased the funding and increased the number of areas,
effectively reducing the potential impact of the pro-
gram.
Federal legislation mandated that widespread citi-
zen participation be included in a city's program.
Sherry Arnstein, chief advisor on citizen participation
for the Model Cities program, felt that the standards
that the government had established were "suggestive
rather than prescriptive, permissive rather than re-
strictive, and a statement of minima rather than
optima."4 Studies of Model Cities programs nationwide
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found that cities did develop structures and processes
in accordance to the established government standards.
The laxness of the standards, however, permitted cities
to circumvent meaningful citizen participation.
This reluctance to cite specific requirements for
citizen participation has been attributed in a large
measure to the negative reaction that resulted from
OEO's maximum participation guidelines in the CAP leg-
islation. In addition to endorsing weak citizen's
participation guidelines in the Model Cities program,
Congress passed an amendment in 1967 which gave each
local establishment the authority to place the local
CAA under its jurisdiction. The Green Amendment also
required CAA's to have their board of directors evenly
divided between city officials, the private sector and
low-income persons. In order to maintain its ability
to provide a vehicle through which low-income persons
throughout the city of Boston would have the right to
self-determination, ABCD managed to arrange a formal
agreement with the Mayor of Boston in which the 1/3,
1/3, 1/3 requirement would not be upheld. Rather,
ABCD's board was made up of 9 city councilmen, 25 low-
income persons, and 17 persons from public, private,
and academic sectors.
The role of ABCD in community development was
strengthened by national attempts to reduce the
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effectiveness of the CAP. Those members of the Board
who were, for the first time, involved in a recognized
position in the politics of survival gained experience
in dealing with the established power structure. Ac-
cording to one author, through the CAP, the poor gained
this experience
... by.the institutional and procedural
means that articulated with that struc-
ture. These means included the CAA's
themselves and the panoply of rules of
the game, in relations with the federal
government, with local city or state of-
ficials, and other local majority com-
munity leaders in business, welfare,
health, and so on. 2 5
This politicization went beyond the board members, and
was extended to practically all low-income persons who
were involved in the program.
Through the medium of the CAA's a short
generation of poverty community leader-
ship has been subsidized and taught how
to deal with the structures that had been
closed to them in the past. 2 6
In addition, a fact of primary significance is that
low-income people were able to gain these skills through
a meaningful employment. CAA benefits provided people
with meaningful jobs.
For example it was no longer necessary
for a woman to earn her living as a do-
mestic and only have a small amount of
energy and time to work for the better-
ment of her neighborhood... instead
(through CAAs), she had a chance to be 27paid to do just that sort of organizing.
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Despite ABCD's effectiveness in bringing about these
changes, or perhaps because of this effectiveness, the
final evolution of the federal government in community
development was aimed to further reduce if not neutral-
ize the effectiveness of the CAP as a vehicle for the
poor for self-determination.
New Federalism
The role of the Nixon administration in community
development reflected that administration's theory that
though state and local government have not always been
responsive to the needs of all people, they are the,
bulwark of the American political system and have the
ultimate responsibility for the health and welfare of
the populace. Through the efforts of the Nixon ad-
ministration, the focus of the War on Poverty was com-
pletely shifted.
In order to make the Model Cities program a Repub-
lican program, reflective of the "New Federalism"
philosophy, the program was essentially transformed
into a mayor's program rather than a poor people's
program.
First, the program focus was shifted from one in
which the priority overall objective was to "enhance
the capability and commitment of local governments to
respond to the needs of its poorest neighborhoods and
poorest residents,"2 9 to a program in which the basic
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mission was to:
enhance the capability and committment
of local governments, working with
neighborhood residents, to marshall the
public and private resources needed to
solve the problems underlying blight and
poverty.. .with the objective of improving
the quality of life of all its citizens.30
Second, where the Johnson Administration put pres-
sure on city halls to accomodate neighborhood groups,
the Nixon Administration dissuaded city halls from
doing this. In keeping with the new philosophy, the
program emphasized the structural reform of local
governments and aimed for further decentralization of
authority to local governments.
Finally, where the Johnson Administration encour-
aged cities to be innovative in their approach to aid
the poor, the Nixon Administration was concerned with
innovative methods for reforming the grant-in-aid sys-
tem. Under the Nixon administration, the CAP along with
other human.services programs, was designated for elim-
ination. Because several CAAs had been successful in
politicizing and organizing the poor, the CAAs and
their constituents were able to circumvent the execu-
tion of this action. Though the CAP was not eliminated,
administrative efforts to design a Republican community
development program which would full embody the "New
Federalism" philosophy negatively impacted the CAP.
The result of these efforts was a "Special Revenue
31
Sharing" proposal. This proposal was later signed
into law by Gerald Ford as the 1974 Housing and Commun-
ity Development Act, commonly referred to as the Com-
munity Development Block Grant Program. The overall
affect of this program was to provide benefits to the
affluent, while falling far below its potential to
help those places and persons most in need--seriously
deteriorated neighborhoods, older cities for whom much
of the housing stock was substandard and overcrowded,
the poor, and the aged.
Conclusion
The evolution of the role of ABCD in community
development reflects its efforts to define what the
process of community development should be. In its
early stages, perceiving community development as a
method, ABCD appeared to be more concerned with its
agenda than with what was happening to its clientele.
The strategy that the agency used during that time was
one of imposition, patterning itself, if not by design
then by result, after the urban renewal program, the
first federally-sponsored community development pro-
gram.
After being designated as the CAA of Boston the
agency, along with CAAs across the country, was forced
to restructure the composition of its board of directors
to give representation to the poor. At this point, the
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concern of the agency was directed toward the process
of community development; that is, creating an environ-
ment in which the poor could exercise their right of
self-determination. 'This change in CAA structure was
challenged by city officials who viewed the movement
as being anti-city hall. The result: the enactment
of the Green Amendment and cuts in the budget of the
CAP.
Federal officials then created the Model Cities
program which emphasized a coordinated approach to
solving urban problems, and de-emphasized citizen par-
ticipation. Finally, with the change in the federal
administration in 1968 came a change in priority re-
garding empowerment of the poor as the Nixon Adminis-
tration attempted to neutralize the small amount of
influence that the poor had attained.
In the face of efforts to reduce its effectiveness,
ABCD brought and continues to bring many benefits to
the low-income residents of Boston. Broadly speaking,
ABCD:
* Politicized the poor who were involved in
the Community Action Program;
e Provided a vehicle through which people
who had informal influence in their com-
munities or who had leadership potential
could further develop and formalize their
skills; and
* Provided participants with meaningful em-
ployment and the opportunity for upward
mobility.
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More specifically, ABCD:
* Completely insulated and weatherized 800
low-income housing units in Boston;
* Provided 14,000 families (many of them
elderly) with financial assistance to pay
their heating bills during the winter
months;
e Deleaded 150 homes in which "children at
risk" live;
* Provides a Head Start program for approxi-
mately 2,000 3-5 year old children each
year;
* Conducts a community college program in
which 400 staff and community people par-
ticipate and have the opportunity to gain
an official Associate of Arts degree; and
e Provides employment, training, and income
to the disadvantaged youth through summer
and year round programs. As of 1977,
95,000 youth had participated in the pro-
gram.
Despite these and other benefits of ABCD's activ-
ities, human services alone will never eliminate pover-
ty in this country. Generally speaking, power and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency co-exist, and it is these factors
that are sorely lacking in poor communities. Human
services, though certainly an essential element in low-
income communities, does not establish economic power,
influence, or independence for residents of these com-
munities. It can therefore never provide the security
that residents of low-income communities need.
ABCD has been adept at coordinating a full range
of human services for the disadvantaged of all age
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groups and races. However, because the problems of
the poor are so complicated, uni-dimensional efforts
are not sufficient as solutions; rather, comprehensive,
coordinated .development strategies are needed. As one
author aptly stated:
The synthesis between business corpor-
ations and community change agencies,
combining the positive elements of each
(can bring) social, political, economic,
and psychological benefits to community
residents that neither approach could
accomplish alone.31
In essence, this synthesis can create a synergism,
a situation in which the simultaneous action of the
two agencies together have a greater total effect than
the sum of their individual effects. ABCD is not un-
aware of the limitations of a strictly human services
approach, but has attempted to achieve an inter-
connectedness between community development activities
and community economic development activities. The
attempts are viewed by many within the agency as an
evolutionary progression of ABCD's role in community
development, and will be examined in Chapter II.
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Introduction
Community economic development encompasses the
same elements as economic development: business crea-
tion, identification of new resources and talent, im-
provement of social and physical environment, and job
creation. The point of difference between the two,
however, is that community economic development is
used to promote economic growth under the direction
and for the benefit of, local residents. Stewart
Perry, former director of the Center for Community
Economic Development (CCED) in Cambridge, Massachusetts
defines community economic development as:
... the creation or strengthening of
economic organizations (or, more tech-
nically, economic institutions) that
are controlled or owned by the resi-
dents of the area in which they are
located or in which they will exert
primary influence. The institutions
that are owned or controlled locally
can include such forms as business
firms, industrial development parks,
housing development corporations,
banks, credit unions, and the cooper-
atives and CDCs (community development
corporations) themselves as the most
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broadly generalized, guiding institu-
tions. They might also include organ-
izations (or services) that upgrade
the human and social environment in
such a way as to increase the economic
value and energy of the'community.1
Perry, who in addition to his directorship played
an integral part in developing the role of OEO in the
CDC movement, strongly states that community economic
development does not have the eradication of poverty
as its immediate aim.
Community economic development by low-
income people cannot be expected to
correct all the problems caused by the
economic system of our society.. .A CDC
will always (or should) find, cooperate
with, or develop other local groups and
organizations to do a part of the ob.
No one organization can do it all.-
Community economic development does, however, give
people who have traditionally been excluded from main-
stream economic institutions the opportunity to design
and manage economic institutions that cater to their
needs.
The primary vehicle through which community eco-
nomic development activities have been conducted in
the United States has been the Community Development
Corporation (CDC). According to Perry, a CDC exhibits
all of the following features:
1) It is an institution focused upon develop-
ing a specific territorial neighborhood or
area, concerned with problems that are pe-
culiar to that area.
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2) The major motivation for development is
pride in locality or territoriality.
3) Its corporate structure offers shares or
membership primarily to residents of the
selected area; if shares or membership are
offered to non-residents, the offering is
such that control remains with the residents.
4) The goals are multiple, but always include
the creation of new economic institutions--
fiscal, industrial, or business.
5) The CDC is a means of enhancing the whole
range of political, social, and economic
opportunities for the groups involved.
6) A CDC ordinarily plans to reinvest profits
in further economic activities and in human
or welfare services.
7) The constituency is most often economically
and socially disadvantaged groups. 3
This vehicle has been particularly useful for the
disadvantaged because it combines the values of a com-
munity with an economic structure of advancement and
mobility that is defined by the community that creates
the corporation.
The contents of this chapter will include an ex-
amination of the early role of the federal government
in community economic development and the impact that
this role has had on ABCD's involvement in this field.
The genesis of the community economic development
movement occurred during the 1960's, the decade in
which thousands of inner-city residents vented their
frustration and anger by physically destroying insti-
tutions'and businesses that they felt perpetuated their
oppression. It was in the wake of these riots, which
left commercial strips in many of the nation's urban
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centers gutted by fire, that attention was directed
to the economic underdevelopment of the pockets of
poverty concentrated in several large cities across
the country.
In some communities, local leaders took.the ini-
tiative to channel the energy of residents into acti-
vities that would make their environment, in the terms
of one author, "a set of opportunities for its inhabi-
tants, instead of a set of problems." 4 Among these
leaders were Deforest Brown, who helped create the
Hough Area Development Corporation in Cleveland, Ohio;
Franklin Florence, who created FIGHT in Rochester, New
York; and the Reverend Leon Sullivan, who set the Zion
Investment Associates into motion in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Each of these organizations embodied,
5in fact created, the CDC philosophy.
The Federal Role in Community Economic Development
Senators Robert Kennedy and Jacob Javits saw the
need for wide scale change, and sponsored federal leg-
islation that today provides the single most important
source of funds for all CDCs. This legislation, Amend-
ment Title I-D of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,
promoted an approach which included 3 key variables
that federal community development policies lacked:
* ,comprehensive, coordinated development
strategies that were not limited to
either human services or physical devel-
opment;
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* the inclusion of business development
strategies; and
e limited funds concentrated in a few
projects.
Spurred by these two senators, and a concerned
group of OEO planners, the federal government became
involved with demonstration projects that were modeled
on the grassroot community economic development move-
ment.
In making its determination of the best vehicle.
for implementing community economic development acti-
vities, OEO wanted to insure that the control of com-
munity economic development would be in the hands of
residents, and not in the political arena. As the
planning process of OEO concurred with the introduc-
tion of the Green Amendment, the agency did not con-
sider CAAs. The end result was a program in which
resident-controlled community development corporations
received funds to plan and manage their own projects,
while their budget investments were subject to OEO
approval. In addition, regulations stipulated that
CDC boards must be truly independent of local CAAs.
Although OEO circumvented CAAs when choosing a vehicle
through which to sponsor community economic develop-
ment, at the request of its constituents, ABCD became
involved in the community development movement.
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ABCD and Community Economic Development
Within two years after the Board of Directors
and staff of ABCD became more representative of its
constituents, the agency became involved in community
economic development activities. In a statement made
to the OEO in 1969, ABCD cited one of its major con-
cerns in the coming years as "encouraging improvements
in the economic environment of Boston's poor neighbor-
hoods."6
The agency made steps toward this end in 1966
when it established a functional area for economic
development as part of an overall plan in which the
central program staff was divided into six functional
areas. The economic development division maintained
a paid professional staff of 2-5 persons for a period
of approximately four years.
The purpose of the Economic Development Division
was to help low-income families make the wisest use
of their own resources through consumer action, educa-
tion, credit unions and to assist the process of in-
stitutional change in the marketing, financial, housing
and insurance practices within the inner city. The
primary strategies used by the agency to carry out
its goal were technical.assistance, information dissem-
ination and advocacy. The specific activities of the
economic-development division are described below.
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Consumer Action. The division established coop-
eratives and provided technical assistance to APACs
that wanted to reproduce the cooperatives, fitting
the needs of their individual communities. Nine APACs
used this assistance, and approximately 100 buying
clubs: food, furniture, appliance, and vitamin were
established. It is estimated that the food items had
an annual sales volume of $80,000 and the furniture
and appliance cooperatives had an annual volume of
$250,000. The advocacy role of the economic develop-
ment division was exercised by advising legislators,
the State Consumer's Council and the Attorney General's
Office on the needs of low-income consumers.
Consumer Education. The division promoted con-
sumer education through the medium of a monthly paper
Consumer News. The paper was prepared and published
by ABCD and distributed to low-income families by the
APACs. The monthly press run was approximately 15,000
.8
copies. In addition to the Consumer News, the eco-
nomic development division prepared and distributed
bi-lingual "Consumer Information" brochures and "Tip
Sheets" through the APACs. The division used sound
films as an educative tool in local consumer education
neighborhood meetings and classes.
Credit Unions. The division provided technical
assistance to nine APACs to establish credit unions
in 1966. By 1968 there were 13 community action fed-
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eral credit unions operating throughout low-income
neighborhoods in the city, though most were concen-
trated in Roxbury and Dorchester. These credit unions
had approximately 4000 members with savings of $100,000;
1203 had a total of $63,738 outstanding in credit union
low interest loans. Four of the credit unions also
issued approximately $200,000 in OEO Family Emergency
Loans to nearly 1000 families. The total assets of
the 13 credit unions at that time was $275,000.
Institutional Change. The economic development
division gave high priority to:
1) Testifying and lobbying for and against
various bills and administrative regulations
that affected low-income populations, pri-
marily as consumers, but occasionally as
producers and sellers.
2) Cooperative efforts with various public
and private state groups involved in con-
sumer protection.
3) Advocacy roles before administrative licen-
sing boards.
4) Exploration of possible areas of cooperation
with city inspection agencies.
Initially, only four APACs had any committments
to economic development; by 1968, ten out of 11 did.
The degree of committment varied considerably, and
budget limitations created a heavy dependence on in-
experienced and non-professional leadership.
The economic development division submitted a
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proposal which brought twelve VISTA workers who held
either bachelor's or master's degrees in economics,
accounting, business administration and financial
management to Boston. The workers were assigned to
the APAC directors to fortify the economic development
activities. The assignments were only for the term
of one year however, and when they departed at the
end of 1968, the agency reverted to its original re-
sources. In 1969, ABCD submitted a Special Impact
Program Proposal to OEO under Part D of Title I of the
Economic Opportunity
have allowed ABCD to
ment persons to its
economic development
needs. Essentially,
help the residents c
neighborhoods creatE
aim for every' APAC.
ture of ABCD,
Act of 1964. This program would
hire qualified economic develop-
staff and broaden its community
activities depending upon local
the goal of the agency was to
f the eleven targeted low-income
a community economic development
Despite the organizational struc-
and the agreement made between ABCD and
the city government, which was atypical to many other
CAAs, its Special Impact Program Proposal was denied.
Within four years of the start-up date, all of
the ABCD/APAC community economic development activities
were phased out. The failure of these activities has
been attributed to two major deficiencies:
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1) A heavy dependence on inexperienced and
non-professional leadership; and
2) Insufficient funds during the crucial
first few years.
ABCD's involvement in community economic development
did not cease in 1970; instead, the form of its in-
volvement changed. For the next year, rather than
promoting community economic development activities
directly through the APACs, primary attention was
directed at providing technical assistance to APACs
to facilitate their efforts to establish community
economic development corporations. The assistance
was primarily in the form of proposal writing and
presentations. Through the efforts of ABCD, in 1970,
Boston's first OEO funded CDCs were created: The
East Boston CDC and Circle Venture Associates. 9
One year later, ABCD received a contract from the
New England Regional Commission (NERCOM) to conduct
a needs assessment of the communities along Blue Hill
Avenue in the Roxbury, Dorchester, and Mattapan sec-
tions of Boston for changes in housing, economic oppor-
tunity and social services, and to make recommendations
for projects that would meet the residents' needs. The
contract was for a one-year planning grant which would
be considered for continued funding upon the successful
completion of the initial contract. Based on extensive
discussions and consultations with citizens groups,
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voluntary and government agencies, and all other prin-
cipal actors, ABCD developed an extensive proposal,
Project Build, to meet the most pressing needs in the
communities as defined by the residents. Beyond the
planning process, no further action was taken on the
project. The involvement of ABCD with NERCOM coin-
cided with the period in which the Nixon Administra-
tion espoused the "New Federalism" philosophy. NERCOM,
as one agency designated for elimination, experienced
severe budget cut backs. Consequently, the role that,
NERCOM could play in facilitating ABCD's community
economic development efforts through Project Build was
effectively reduced.
ABCD has not been atypical in trying to redefine
community development. A large number of CAAs through-
out the country have expanded, or have intentions to
expand, their traditional social service focus to de-
velop, manage, and assist with community economic de-
12
velopment activities in their communities. Several
reasons have been cited in explanation of this trend:
e CAAs desire for dependable local dollars
that are not subject to political or
policy fluctuations.
* Pressures from low-income groups for
measures of community control that are
predicated on a reliable economic founda-
tion.
* CAA belief that successful community eco-
nomic development can serve the immediate
needs of.the poor.
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* CAA hope that community economic develop-
ment might offer a better way to underwrite
new or extended CAP program efforts.
* CAA view that successful community economic
development is important in revitalizing
low-income communities,' enhancing their in-
dependence, and strengthening their clout
in the political process.13
This trend among CAAs has drawn attention to their
role in community economic development on both national
and local levels. In 1971 CCED prepared a report which
described the economic development needs of a selected
group of New England based CAPs. Based on the 1971
needs assessment, and their interaction with various
CAAs, in 1976 CCED submitted a proposal to provide
community economic development assistance to CAAs in
New England to the Community Services Administration.
In addition to the support of CCED, a group of New
England CAAs and CDCs made steps toward establishing
a network when, in 1976, a regional conference was
held to discuss issues of community economic develop-
ment.
Nationally, CAP-related organizations appear to
be in the process of reassessing the definition of
what constitutes acceptable vehicles for community
economic development. In 1977, the national director
of the CAP, Frank Jones, stated that CAA participation
in community economic development is not illegal.
The following year, economic improvement specialists
were assigned to each regional CAP office to provide
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technical assistance to CAAs. Within this past year,
the National CAP Association created an economic de-
velopment committee to assess the role of CAAs in
community economic development.
Despite the growing interest among CSA regional,
national, and affiliated groups, little action has
taken place. CCED has not received a response to its
proposal; the regional economic improvement specialists
in Boston plays a brokerage role rather than one of .
direct assistance; and CSA has not translated the CDC
experience to CAAs. CSA has, however, provided finan-
cial support to CCED to conduct a study during the
summer of 1979 on CAA involvement in community economic
development. Also, CSA does provide technical assist-
ance grants to CAAs which can be used to promote com-
munity economic development activities.
Recently, ABCD identified Mattapan as a Boston
neighborhood that is in need of special services. The
agency has received one of. these grants from CSA, and
it intends to use the funds to sponsor a comprehensive
community economic development program in Mattapan.
Conclusion
Because of CSA regulations and the lack of finan-
cial support, ABCD has been unable to establish a for-
mal "interconnected" relationship between human ser-
vices and community development that the Executive
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Director of ABCD Inc. feels is sorely needed. In his
opinion, ABCD has a massive infrastructure unmatched
in Boston which, if given flexibility and support,
could develop a system which would implement compre-
hensive development strategies in low-income neighbor-
hoods in Boston; a system which could meet the human
service and economic needs of low-income residents.
As a result, in the past decade, the agency's
direct involvement in community economic development
through the promotion of ventures has not been stable.
Its indirect involvement through advocacy and educa-
tion, however, has been continuous. In addition, ABCD
has promoted the economic development of Boston's
low-income communities through its manpower personnel
purchasing and leasing policies.
The employment and training component of ABCD
concentrates on three major areas:
0 finding jobs for the economically disadvan-
taged;
e training the economically disadvantaged; and
e assisting the economically disadvantaged in
becoming job ready.
In addition, the majority of ABCD's staff (83%) reside
in low-income communities.
ABCD maintains a list of minority and neighbor-
hood based providers of goods and services. The
agency has fostered the use of such vendors, by both
ABCD, Central, and its delegate agencies, in the
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purchase of services (contracts for construction, re-
modeling, maintenance, security, printing, etc.) and
supplies and equipment. On contracts for which bids
are required, such contractors are regularly furnished
the bidding requests and specifications. Such vendors
account for the expenditure of nearly $500,000 of
ABCD and APAC funds annually. Several years ago, when
a minority owned banking institution was being formed,
ABCD joined other organizations in utilizing the bank
as a depository of funds. To date, the agency main-
tains an account with this institution.
Finally, in terms of its leasing practices, the
majority of ABCD and APAC facilities are located in
the target neighborhoods and are rented from community
based organizations or local landlords. With the re-
ceipt of the CSA technical assistance grant, ABCD will
have the opportunity to create the "interconnected"
relationship that was described earlier in this chap-
ter. Before determining the role that ABCD can play
in the economic development of Mattapan, one must
first determine if there is a need for community eco-
nomic development activities in Mattapan. The basis
for this need will be explored in Chapter III.
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Introduction
In the past two decades, the City of Boston has
experienced dramatic shifts in population. Much has
been made of the emigration of the middle class from
the City to the suburbs, and the impact that this shift
has had on the economic well-being of Boston. However,
little attention and coverage has been given to the
less dramatic but equally significant changes which
have occured in the Boston neighborhood of
Mattapan.
Boston is a city of seventeen neighborhoods. In
the early 1960's ABCD Inc., along with the federal
government, surveyed these neighborhoods and identified
eleven of them as having significant low-income popu-
lations in need of specialized services. The remain-
ing neighborhoods were solidly enough populated by
middle and upper-income residents to be deemed econom-
ically and socially stable and not in need of such
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services.
Since this time, the population and the related
physical and psycho-social conditions in the previous-
ly "non-targeted" neighborhood of Mattapan has changed.
Beginning in the late 1960's and early 1970's,
the Blue Hill Avenue/Norfolk section of Boston wit-
nessed an influx of new families.
Many of these new residents were from Boston,
while others were migrants, new to the Boston area.
The majority, however, were both economically and
ethnically different from the old residents. As the
homogeneity of the neighborhood changed, many old
residents became fearful about the future of their
neighborhood. This fear was perceived by realty agents,
and block-busting techniques were used heavily in the
area. As an example, within a two year span, it is
estimated that approximately 900 homes were sold in
Mattapan. Many of these homes were purchased by fami-
lies who lacked the finances to maintain the homes,
and it is estimated by the BRA that a minimum of 40%
of these sales resulted in foreclosure.
The physical, economic and social changes which
occured earlier were not only the result of population
shifts, but were in themselves causative factors in
neighborhood decay and instability. The rapid turn-
over in -the housing market, in combination with the
fact that the neighborhoods' racial composition was
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shifting, created a cycle of self-perpetuating prob-
lems. In a study of home mortgage lending patterns
in Boston, through statistical analysis it was found
that the racial composition of a neighborhood was a
"significant factor in explaining bank investment
patterns even after controlling for measurable economic
and risk-related investment determinants." The study
concluded that bank home mortgage lending "appears to
be racially discriminatory in effect, if not in intent."
The BRA has acknowledged that red-lining is indeed a
problem in sections of Mattapan and that it has con-
tributed to the abandonment problem in that district.
In the summer of 1979, ABCD is scheduled to re-
ceive a technical assistance grant from CSA
to develop and implement a comprehensive community
economic development program in Mattapan. The purpose
of this chapter is to document the conditions that pre-
vail in Mattapan and cite the needs of the community
as perceived by the residents. The first section of
this chapter presents a profile of the community,
looking at demographic, economic and housing condi-
tions. The second section cites the concerns of resi-
dents regarding neighborhood conditions and examines
the responses of residents and the city government to
these conditions.
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Section I
General Overview
Mattapan is located seven miles south of downtown
Boston. The neighborhood is flanked by the wealthy
suburb of Milton as its southern border, by Dorchester
as. its norther border, with Hyde Park on the west.*
The neighborhood is divided into four sub-areas: Wel-
lington Hill and Blue Hill Avenue/Norfolk in the north-
ern section of Mattapan, and Eastern and Western Matta-
pan in the southern section.
According to Census data, the population of Mat-
tapan has increased slightly over the past twenty'
years, from 44,290 in 1960, to 45,449 in 1970. The
1975 State Census cited the population of Mattapan as
being 47,674.
Demographics
Race
Longitudinal data on the racial composition of
Mattapan indicates that the neighborhood has undergone
significant racial change over the past two decades.
The total non-white population increased from 0.4% in
1960 to 42.1% in 1970, to 80% in 1977.2
Age
The 1975 State Census data on the age distribu-
tion within Mattapan indicate that Mattapan has a
*See map in Appendix.
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relatively young population; 36.2% of the total Matta-
pan population was under twenty years of age, as com-
pared to 33.4% for the City of Boston as a whole.
According to the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA),
currently there are fewer elderly in Mattapan than in
the city as a whole. Only 22% of the adults in Matta-
pan are over 55, as opposed to 28% citywide.
Education
1970 Census data indicate that the median level
of education of Mattapan residents was in parity with
that of the City of Boston (12%). More recent infor-
mation on Mattapan from the Boston Urban Observatory
(BUO) in 1977 indicate that 40% of the residents have
high school diplomas; 25% did not complete high school,
and 35% of the residents have some college. 3
Housing
Housing in Mattapan varies widely both by type
and condition. Housing types range from a predominance
of multi-family units in northern Mattapan to a pre-
dominance of single family units in the southern sec-
tions. There has been very little new construction in
Mattapan since 1970. Housing attrition in Mattapan
during the period between 1970 and 1974 far exceeded
the number of new units constructed resulting in a
net decrease in the amount of housing stock of 222.4
According to the 1970 Census data, only 20% of
the housing stock in Mattapan has been built since
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1959. Twenty-five percent of the housing was built
between 1940 and 1959, and the remaining 55% was old-
er, having been built before 1939. Much of the older
housing stock is multi-family units and is concentrated
in the northern section of Mattapan--76% of the housing
was built before 1939. Due to its age, this housing
requires frequent and costly repairs.
Of the total number of dwelling units in Matta-
pan in 1970 (7039), 679 or approximately 10% are in
need of repair with costs in excess of 1000.5-
A 1973 survey of housing conditions in Mattapan
found that approximately one-half of the residential
buildings that were identified as being in need of
major repairs were located in Wellington Hill. A
study conducted later in 1976, of over 1/3 of the
residential structures in Wellington Hill, discovered
that 8% of the housing stock needed repairs which
would cost over $1000 per dwelling unit.6 Forty-eight
percent of the homes surveyed needed repairs costing
between $500 and $1000 per unit.
According to BRA statistics, the majority of Mat-
tapan residents (55%) are renters; 10% of the residents
own their homes and 32% of Mattapan residents have
mortgages. The median monthly housing costs in Matta-
pan for 1977 as estimated by the Hart Survey was $167,
as compa'red with the City average of $178.00.
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The number of occupied housing units was relative-
ly high and in parity with figures for the citywide
average (94.5%) in 1970. For this same year, the
vacancy rate estimates as a percent of all housing
units, was 5.5%, slightly lower than the 6% rate for
the city. 7
Economics
Income
The median income level of residents in Mattapan
according to the 1970 Census data was $10,158 in abso-
lute dollars. Within the neighborhood sub-categories,
the median income level of families in the northern
section of Mattapan was substantially lower than the
Neighborhood average. According to the BRA, the Blue
Hill/Norfolk section had a median family income of
$7857; the Wellington Hill section had a median family
income of $8350. The number of families with incomes
below $5000 in the district of Mattapan was lower than
that of the city as a whole; 16% and 22%, respective-
ly.8 Again figures for Wellington Hill and Blue Hill/
Norfolk are higher than that of the district average:
22% of the families of Wellington Hill had incomes
less than $5000 as did 24% of families in Blue Hill/
Norfolk.
Employment
BRA employment estimates for 1977 cited the un-
employment rate in Mattapan for those sixteen years
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old and over as 21.6%. This figure is 8.8 percentage
points higher than the comparable unemployment rate
for the City of Boston.
Statistics from the Dorchester Neighborhood Em-
ployment Center for the program year 1977-1978 indi-
cated that 15% of their clients came from Mattapan.
And, in a 1977 study by the BUO on the social service
needs of Mattapan residents, 15% of the sample popula-
tion indicated that they had skills which did not
match their present job; 10% indicated a desire to in-
crease their work hours; 15% indicated that they were
dissatisfied with their present job but did not know
where to go for help in Mattapan.
Business
The center of most of the activity in Mattapan
is in the central business district located in Matta-
pan Square. The main shopping corridor of the square
is approximately 3 blocks long and is parallel to
Blue Hill Avenue. Within this corridor are several
retail shops, banks, offices and eating places. Though
most of the merchants reside outside of Mattapan the
business in the square provides convenient shopping,
and employment for residents in and around Mattapan.
Over the years, the City of Boston has invested funds
to increase and maintain the viability of the square.
These funds have been designated for rebate programs
for merchants who make physical improvements to their
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place of businesses, foot-patrol-police protection
in the square, street and lighting improvement, and
parking facilities. As of 1977, Mattapan Square had
the lowest vacancy rate (1%) of any neighborhood
business district in Boston. The merchants of the
square are well organized, the majority of whom are
members of the Mattapan Board of Trade Association.
The Association is a strong support group for merchants
who are located in Mattapan Square.
Although Mattapan Square is one of the most via-
ble neighborhood business districts in the City of
Boston, as one travels north along Blue Hill Avenue,
within two blocks the character of the neighborhood
changes. As one resident stated, "once you leave the
square and go down Blue Hill Avenue, it's like a des-
ert."9 There are a few small shops along Blue Hill
Avenue, but they are scattered, and many are in dis-
repair. Intersperced between the shops are burned
out abandoned buildings, legacies of the riots of the
sixties.
Section II
Resident Concerns
In a survey of Mattapan residents that was spon-
sored by the Mattapan Branch of the Boston Public Li-
brary in 1973, crime, the poor academic and antiquated
physical conditions of the schools in the area, the
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lack of recreational facilities for teenagers, the
lack of adequate city services, housing abandonment
and deterioration, and the lack of cultural or edu-
cational resources in the area were cited as issues
of major concern to the residents. Since that time
the City of Boston has sponsored a host of programs
in Mattapan to address these concerns.
The types of programs that have been sponsored
by the City can be grouped into four areas: housing,
neighborhood business district, capital improvements
and neighborhood services. Specific programs which
were related to the expressed needs of the residen'ts
are described below.*
City Response
In 1973 the City of Boston instituted the Mayor's
Housing Improvement Program (MHIP). This was an ex-
perimental program to provide incentives for owner oc-
cupants of one to three family homes throughout the
city to rehabilitate their homes. MHIP lasted for
approximately two years, at which point it was expanded
to the Housing Improvement Program. Since then, the
HIP program has been a major tool used by the City of
Boston to revitalize Mattapan and other areas of Bos-
ton. The basic function of the Housing Improvement
*See Appendix for a complete synopsis of the
programs sponsored by the City in Mattapan.
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Program has not deviated from the original concept
as mandated by the experimental Mayor's Improvement
program. Essentially this program provided homeowners
with a rebate (20-50% based on income) for investments
made on code-related improvements to their properties.
In addition to the Home Improvement Program, the
city sponsors 4 Homesteading Program. Under this pro-
gram, homes are purchased and rehabilitated by a non-
profit organization (Community Training Dynamics)
which is affiliated with the city. After completion
homes are sold for the cost of the rehabilitation.
Security
In addition to the regular police services, in
1975 the city contracted with the Boston Police to pro-
vide a security patrol in the Mattapan Square Business
District. The Boston Police Department is funded di-
rectly by the city for the security services to pay
overtime wages and neighborhood groups receive money
from the city to publicize the services.
Despite the existence of these services in Matta-
pan, a survey conducted by Peter B. Hart, Research
Associates in 1977 found that Mattapan residents felt
that well maintained housing, safety, parks/recreation
activities, low taxes, city services and employment
opportunities were missing in Mattapan.
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The dissatisfaction with city services in Matta-
pan, and the perceived lack of responsiveness of the
city to the needs of Mattapan residents has become
mainfest in proliferation of neighborhood block clubs
and street associations.
Neighborhood Groups
Currently in Mattapan, there are approximately
30 block clubs. The majority of the block clubs deal
specifically with issues concerning their particular
street, and are organized to cover small sections of
Mattapan.
The groups are practically oriented and exist to
improve communication among residents. As one resi-
dent stated, "fear is what brought us together, the
neighbors weren't communicating, crime was rampant in
the area..."10 The groups have social activities as
well as those that are specificall to improve the
conditions of their areas. The activities range from
the formation of citizen's security patrols and "house
watches" to sponsoring street festivals and bowling
leagues.
In addition to the various block associations,
there are two associations that transcend street boun-
daries, comprised of residents from all of Mattapan.
One such, group is the Mattapan Block Association,
which develops and programs activities for the entire
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Mattapan Community. Their activities to date have in-
cluded programs for youth, the formation of a house-
watch-crime prevention network, the organization- of
a neighborhood alert community patrol, and a clean-up
campaign. The organization generates its own funds
through fund-raising activities.
The other.Mattapan wide block association related
group is the District Council #3. The District Coun-
cil #3 has been in existence for two and one-half years.
Its original and present function is to act as an um-
brella organization, to provide for cohesiveness be-
tween the numerous block associations in Mattapan.
Operating under the assumption that in unity there is
strength, District Council #3 acts as a channel for
street organizations to air their grievances so that
these grievances can be collectively presented to the
city. It is represented by four forces in the commun-
ity: the local block clubs; the Mattapan Board of
Trade; community agencies, service groups and churches;
and the local police department. One of the major,
immediate concerns of the council is raising the con-
fidence of residents about their neighborhood. During
the years in which the population of Mattapan under-
went rapid demographic changes, it received a lot of
negative publicity from the media. The publicity
merely exacerbated the fears of residents concerning
the future of their neighborhood. Consequently, an
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inherent function of the council is to strengthen the
community by instilling the feeling among residents
that they have a vehicle for control, a means through
which their needs can be addressed. According to one
of the coordinators of the council, this function is
perhaps the most important one because it has been
instrumental in encouraging residents to remain in the
area.
In addition to the citizens groups there are
three community development corporations in Mattapan.
Through the efforts of the District Council #3
a community development corporation was incorporated
in March of 1979 to address the problems with which
city has had, in the opinion of the council, minimal
success, citing the economic development of their com-
munity as a high priority. This CDC is currently in
the process of searching for the resources needed to
allow them to hire staff to begin developing programs
for the community. One of the coordinators of this
group stated that this community development corpora-
tion would be autonomous from the City of Boston and
that it was likely that the two would be competing for
similar funds.
Another Mattapan CDC has been incorporated as an
autonomous legal entity since September 1978. Again,
this CDC is in its formative stages and has not imple-
mented any programs to date. The organization has
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recently submitted applications for funding from a
variety of sources, including the City of Boston, so
that they can hire consultants. Two projects that the
organization is considering concern the Mattapan
Branch Public Library, and the lack of adequate health
facilities in the area. This group is currently com-
posed of the original organizers, and has plans to
conduct a major membership drive in the fall of 1979.
The Lena Park Community Development Corporation
is also located in Mattapan. The services offered by
Lena Park are primarily referral and informative,
directing residents to the social services offered
in and around the area. Though Lena Park is primarily
a social service agency, it has incorporated a housing
preservation program into its services. The housing
preservation program relies heavily on the homestead-
ing program, including counseling services on mainen-
ance, and is concentrated in the Dorchester area.
Conclusion
The profile of the neighborhood is indicative of
the disparity in the housing conditions and socio-
economic conditions that prevail in Mattapan. Although
the City of Boston has implemented a variety of pro-
grams in Mattapan throughout the CDBG program, few
have materially benefited the majority of residents
in Mattapan to their satisfaction. The city's housing
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programs have not halted the decline and abandonment
in northern Mattapan where the worse conditions pre-
vail.
Only 12% of Mattapan residents eligible for the
program have participated, while the total number of
eligible structures as cited by the BRA is 2858.
Clearly, the Housing Improvement Program is not meet-
ing the needs of the majority of eligible residents
in Mattapan. Studies of the HIP have suggested that
low participation rates can be attributed to the ina-
bility of eligible persons to provide the "front-end"
cash that is needed to participate. By the BRA's
own admission
To address the housing in extremely
declining residential areas within
the Mattapan district the present 20%
rebate program has been ineffective
in an approach for a comprehensive
housing rehabilitation effort."l
In view of the large number of homes that are in
need of rehabilitation in Mattapan, one might question
the effectiveness of the homesteading program, Through
the program, 25 homes were rehabilitated in 1978 while
only nine homes are scheduled for rehabilitation in
1979.
Finally, despite the viability of business district
in Mattapan Square, the businesses in the square are
predominantly small retail stores that are not labor
intensive. Few residents are able to find employment
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in the neighborhood, and the unemployment rate in
Mattapan is 8.8% higher than the citywide average.
The recent proliferation of neighborhood groups
in Mattapan is a visible sign that the residents have
needs which have not been met by current services.
One neighborhood leader who has been active in Matta-
pan for the past 12 years stated that the delivery of
city services is based on the priorities of the city.
In his opinion, Mattapan is low on the city's priority
list, and consequently the city is responsive only in
crisis situations. The groups are currently organiz-
ing themselves so that they can begin to exert control
over the forces of order within their community. With-
in this framework, one group has identified the econom-
ic development of Mattapan as a high priority item.
With the receipt of its grant, ABCD will be in
a position to assist the residents of Mattapan in their
endeavors. Chapter IV will examine the potential role
that ABCD can play in the economic development of
Mattapan.
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Introduction
In a manual on economic development, the authors
cite the CAA as a potential source for supporting com-
munity economic development activities. As mentioned
in Chapter III, ABCD is scheduled to receive a techni-
cal assistance grant to design and implement a compre-
hensive program which will coordinate social service
programs with physical and economic development pro-
grams. The agency has a long history of demonstrated
effectiveness in social service programming. Its
record in the economic development field as Chapter II
indicated has not yet been fully established. The
purpose of this chapter is to determine a feasible
structural role for ABCD to play in the economic de-
velopment of Mattapan. This chapter is arranged in
the following manner:
Section 1 presents an outline of the skills that
are needed in community economic development.
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Section 2 presents and examination of ABCD to
determine how well ABCD's resources match those
which are needed in community economic develop-
ment.
Section 3 cites alternative roles that ABCD could
play in the economic development of Mattapan.
Section 4 presents the conclusions of the chapter
and a recommendation for the most feasible role
for ABCD.
Section I
In a manual on economic development, the authors
cited three ways in which a CAA could assist with eco-
nomic development activities. They were: as a source
of technical assistance, as a funding source, and as
a power resource.
Technical Assistance
The CDC experience suggests guidelines for the
type of technical skills that an organization needs
to promote community economic development. The skills
can be categorized into four areas: planning, legal,
fiscal and management.
Planning
Planners are needed to perform four basic func-
tions:
1) Grantsmanship Functions - that is locating
funding sources which are interested in
funding the proposals that the organization
develops.
2) Program Evaluation - the organization must
be able to design, implement and anlayze
programs, customized to programmatic and
funding source needs.
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3) Program Determination - the organization
must be able to conduct needs assessments
of the community that it intends to serve.
Legal Assistance
Legal assistance is needed to satisfy five basic
functions:
1) To design the organizational structure to
implement community economic development
activities.
2) To design mechanisms for specific forms of
development which might require the creation
of subsidiaries.
3) To assist with tax problems.
4) To assist with securities problems.
5) Specifically for CAAs, legal assistance is
needed to investigate and correct potential
problems related to meeting CSA regulation.
Fiscal Assistance
Fiscal assistance is needed to perform six basic
functions:
1) Determination of the reasonableness of fi-
nancial data included in the budget.
2) Financial analyses of budgets.
3) Preparation of financial reports for funding
sources.
4) Maintenance of contract files, billing files,
and the like.
5) Billing procedures.
6) Financial performance auditing.
Management
The skills of managers are needed to carry on the
functions needed to maintain the actual operation, being
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concerned with:
1) Production.
2) Marketing.
3) Labor market preparation.
4) Financing.
5) All aspects of management.
In addition to these services, Susan Horn-Moo of
CCED cites three types of persons whose skills are
critical to community economic development activities.
They are: persons whom whe terms "entrepreneurial
types," organizational development specialists, and
economic development planners who are skilled in bus-
iness techniques. The "entrepreneurial type" is the
key person in community economic development. This
person is needed for the purposes of:
1) keeping abreast of federal and private
funding sources, and
2) making the arrangements for ventures.
The organizational development specialists are needed
to:
1) insure that residents are kept abreast of
all activities, and
2) act as the liaison between the residents
and the staff to insure that the community
has constant and influential input into all
project programs.
The economic development planners are needed to per-
form the following functions:
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1) identify potential ventures - through re-
search and studies such as land inventory
and market analysis
2) prepare venture packages for financing
3) develop models for housing development, and
4) develop business packages for light indus-
try including operating costs, financing
methods, and management assistance.
Funding
A sponsor of community development activities
must also have capital to support and maintain staff,
programming activities, and venture start-ups.
Power Resources
Finally, the impact that a sponsor of community
economic development can have is greatly influenced
by its "power resources," that is, its ability to mo-
bilize the poor, the business community, the govern-
ment sector--the three groups that are key to the
process.
The three factors described above are not dis-
crete, rather each individual one can potentially in-
fluence the other. For example, an agency that is
well-established and has a working rela'tion with the
business or government sectors can use its relation-
ship as a vehicle through which to obtain funds and
technical assistance. As a report entitled "Community
Economic Development and the States," prepared by
Carl Sussman and Stephen Klein found, although state
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planning and assistance is inadequate or non-existent,
"Once rapport has been established with state officials,
they often became allies in search for further aid." 2
The following section of this chapter will exam-
ine the capacity of ABCD in the three areas described
above.
Section II
Although ABCD can "purchase" the resources needed
to provide assistance to Mattapan residents, the CSA
grant is only guaranteed for one year. The capacity
of the agency to provide assistance with its present
resources must also be considered. The role that
ABCD can play in community economic development can
be hampered or facilitated by its internal and exter-
nal resources.
Technical Assistance
An analysis of the experience of the staff of
ABCD indicates that the agency does not have the ex-
pertise in community economic development to provide
a core staff to the residents of Mattapan. The assis-
tance that the agency can provide is:
0 Legal services such as tax, leases, corpor-
ate by-laws preparation and reports
* Grantsmanship.
* Program evaluation
e - Proposal development
* Program monitoring
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* Statistical gathering and analysis of
information
* Determination of the reasonableness of
financial data
e Financial analyses of budgets
e Preparation of financial reports for fund-
ing sources
* Billing procedures
* Financial performance auditing
* Personnel services
* Training for community organizers
With the possible exception of providing a community
organizer or training in this area, the agency can
only provide support services.
Funding Source
With the grant from CSA the agency could
hire staff with the appropriate skills. Outside of
those funds, the fiscal structure of ABCD allows lit-
tle flexibility for the agency in the allocation of
its funds. An analysis of the fiscal structure of
ABCD indicates that its current capacity will not
permit it to be a strong financial source for community
economic development programs, except perhaps to pro-
vide equity or seed money. Although the agency oper-
ated programs at the level of $21,030,428.00 in 1978,
managing funds from three federal sources, 82% of the
funds were earmarked for specific programs. The re-
maining 18% were used to support staff and ABCD's dele-
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gate agencies.
To increase funds to support economic development
activities in Mattapan the agency would need to either
reallocate its non-earmarked funds, or seek funding
from additional sources. The first option would be
politically difficult to implement. The ABCD board
of directors makes the decisions concerning fund allo-
cation, and the APAC directors occupy the majority of
seats on the board. It is highly unlikely that the
board would condone further decreases in funds for
service delivery. The amount of funds that the agency
receives are barely adequate to meet the existing ser-
vice needs of low-income residents, as budget increases
lag behind inflation. Much of the flexible funds are
invested into programs which provide a large number
of jobs for community people. When one considers the
fact that community economic development programs
typically cannot hire a large number of people, one
better understands the reluctance of APAC directors.
The agency's ability to seek funds from other
sources is limited as well, as federal regulations
stipulate that CAAs are not eligible to receive excess
funds from nongovernment sources. As stated in section
225-C, Title II of the Community Services Act of 1974,
Director (of a CAP) shall not require
non-federal contributions in excess
of approved cost of programs/activities
after calculating the per centum of
federal assistance.
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ABCD could apply for CSA Title VII Community Economic
Development funds. This would limit the agency's
options, in regard to its role in Mattapan since CSA
regulations. would require that the CDC be autonomous
of the agency.
Power Resources
Although its internal fiscal and personnel struc-
ture is too weak to support community economic devel-
opment, as an institutional power, the agency has a
working relationship with the low-income population
of Boston, other human services agencies, and the
business, industrial and government sectors.
The Board of Directors of ABCD, Inc. is presently
composed of 51 members, which govern all of ABCD's
programs and develop the policy of the agency. Twenty-
five of the members are publicly elected representa-
tives from eleven of Boston's low-income neighborhoods.
Seventeen other members are from the business, finan-
cial, labor, religious, university, and social service
communities, Black and Puerto Rican civil rights groups,
and public housing tenants organizations. Boston's
nine city councillors also have seats on the ABCD
Board.
Within the organizational structure of ABCD,
there is a department which functions as liaison be-
tween the Agency and the private and government sectors.
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Through this department, the Industrial and Government
Relations, numerous linkages have been established
with the business community through organizations
such as the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, the
Associated Industries of Massachusetts, the Massachu-
setts Restaurant Association, Associated Builders and
Contractors, and the like. Much of the department's
time is spent making arrangements with business firms
to provide instructors, equipment for training, on-
the-job training, and job placements for ABCD clients.
The industrial and governmental relations staff also
arranges for businesses to provide technical assis-
tance to staff of various departments at ABCD.
This division also has a legislative committee
which acts in a public relations and advocacy function.
There is a two-way communication network between the
industry and government sectors. The committee main-
tains continued contact between the agency and con-
gressional representatives, keeping the representatives
informed and aware of the needs and demands of ABCD
clientele. Congressional representatives often obtain
ABCD's opinion on legislation, and reciprocally the
agency often obtains letters of support from congress-
women and men.
ABCD coordinates its activities with other agencies
in four-ways: program planning, development and im-
plementation, technical assistance and training, and
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advocacy. Its services are frequently requested and
utilized by the federal, state and city governments,
as well as private agencies.
Implementation
As a recent example, early in 1978 ABCD was called
upon by the Governor of Massachusetts to implement the
Boston Emergency Fuel Assistance Program. Special
crisis intervention funds, appropriated to the Commun-
ity Services Administration by Congress, were made
available to the states via a formula allocation.
These special funds were designated by Congress for
payments to utility companies and fuel dealers on be-
half of low-income eligible households for energy/
fuel supplies. As the implementing agency for Boston,
ABCD collaborated with over 62 agencies, among which
were the State Department of Public Welfare, local
neighborhood service centers, the Little CIty Halls,
home care corporations, and other agencies to identi-
fy, recruit, assess and verify over 6000 eligible
households. The project involved the development and
implementation of standardized intake process forms
for use by all collaborating agencies, procedures for
verification of information, linkages with local banks
and utility companies for the escrow payments, all
publicity, and media coverage. ABCD designed and im-
plemented this system in a three week period. The
agency later received commendations from CSA, the
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Governor of Massachusetts and the General Accounting
Office for the thoroughness and quality of the system.
Technical Assistance and Training
In the area of technical assistance and training,
ABCD's most recent collaborative efforts in -the train-
ing field were conducted by staff from ABCD's Housing
and Energy Conservation Department. In response to
concerns initiated by ABCD neighborhood staff, the
housing staff offered two series of housing advocacy
training sessions. These workshops were attended by
one hundred social service and community workers from
agencies throughout the city.
Advocacy
The advocacy role of ABCD has been carried out
at the state and national level, with respect to both
the legislative and executive branches of government.
From time to time, this activity has increased re-
sources available to Boston's low-income community.
At the time when the national administration was ac-
tively seeking to destroy community action, ABCD suc-
cessfully opposed this action in court, and played a
leadership role in the eventual restoration and increase
of community action funding.
The agency has constantly advocated on behalf of
the poor and the disadvantaged in the form of public
statements on issues such as welfare reform, the ener-
gy crisis, and unemployment; by providing testimony
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at legislative hearings in Boston and in Washington;
and by meeting with Cabinet level officials to advise
on policy matters affecting programs.
ABCD has been effectively instrumental in opening
up policymaking and advisory boards in many public and
private organizations to participation by representa-
tives of the groups to be served including minorities
and women. Its record also includes an array of for-
mer employees or board members who now hold top level
positions in the Boston Office of the Community Ser-
vices Administration, the HEW Offices of Human Devel-
opment, and the Children Youth and Families unit, the
Small Business Administration, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, and other public and private agencies.
ABCD recently coordinated its advocacy activities
with over fifty human services oganizations including
consumer, advocacy, civic, professional and provider
groups to form the Massachusettts Human Services Coali-
tion (MHSC). MHSC was organized to ensure a more ac-
tive citizen participation in the formulation of human
services policies. The organization has focuses on
research, policy analysis, informational updates, and
a statewide grassroots project to coordinate local and
regional advocacy groups. Through MHSC, ABCD has, and
continues, to play its advocacy role. MHSC meets with
state officials to present its position and recommen-
dations on issues affecting the poor.
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Section III
In view of the problems and resources in Matta-
pan, there are four options that.ABCD may consider in
determining its ultimate role in the economic develop-
ment of Mattapan. The options can be grouped under
the categories of
1) Direct Involvement
2) Indirect Involvement
3) Catalyst
4) Technical Assistance
The four options are described below.
Option 1 - Direct Involvement
Under this option ABCD could use the technical
assistance grant to lay the groundwork for the agency
to become involved in the development and management
of Mattapan based enterprise. The agency could exam-
ine the possibilities of:
0 converting a current program component
into a for-profit enterprise (e.g. weather-
ization)
e expansion into new areas
e bringing industry into the neighborhood
(e.g. subcontracting from a business or
light industrial firm).
Option 2 - Indirect Involvement
Under this option, ABCD could work closely with
the CDCs in Mattapan, providing human services pro-
gramming, community outreach, and support services
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(e.g. proposal development, advocacy, research). To
encourage the formation of formal ties between ABCD
and the CDC, the structure of the boards could be one
in which membership overlaps. That is, ABCD could
provide seats on its board of directors for Mattapan
resident CDC members and the CDC could provide a
seat on its board of directors for an ABCD representa-
tive. This is an option which the Natchitoches Area
Action Association, a CAA in Louisiana has chosen.
The CAA does much of the groundwork for economic de-
velopment proposals such as writing all of the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) applications. The CAA
has also performed feasibility studies on potential
industrial ventures in Natchitoches.
Option 3 - Catalyst
Under this option, ABCD could play a catalytic
role similar to that which the agency played in the
formation of the East Boston, Charlestown, and China-
town CDCs. Since there is at least one CDC in Matta-
pan that is interested in promoting economic activities,
ABCD could give its technical assistance grant to that
CDC to use as seed money for its operations.
Option 4 - Technical Assistance
Under this option, ABCD could use its technical
assistance grant to provide a staff to the Mattapan
CDC. The CDC would exercise the decision-making
power over the economic development activities.
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This is a strategy which is exercised by the
Northwest South Dakota CAA in Sisseton, S.D. The
CAA provides technical assistance to a separately in-
corporated body that is funded through the South Dako-
ta State Department of Agriculture.
The option chosen depends in a large part on the
type of committment ABCD can make to the community,
and the goals and objectives of ABCD in regard to its
posture on economic development. The ultimate goal
of the agency is to assist in the economic development
of all of its target neighborhoods. This posture will
obviously have a bearing on the extent of the involve-
ment that ABCD can assume in Mattapan.
Conclusion
The limited scope of ABCD's staff and monetary
resources constrains the options of the agency in terms
of the role it can play in community economic develop-
ment. As Section II indicated, the agency could pro-
vide assistance such as grantsmanship, conducting needs
assessments, teaching strategies of community organiz-
ing, fiscal management, and certain types of legal
assistance. However, none of the staff have experience
in community economic development, and the extent of
technical assistance that the current staff can provide
is clearly limited.
In reference to the first option, community
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economic development activities which involve the
establishment of ventures or enterprises require a
financial structure that has the ability to undertake
capital investment committments over a time frame of
at least three to five years. In order to sponsor
business ventures sufficient funds are needed in the
beginning to support the enterprise until income from
sales is built up to cover operating expenses. ABCD
has no track record in this area and would undoubtedly
find it difficult to obtain funding. To implement
such a strategy would require an enormous time committ-
ment from the agency. Consequently, other program
areas could suffer, or the agency could be forced to
relinquish its ultimate goal of developing a system
which could meet both the human service and the eco-
nomic needs of low-income residents throughout the
City of Boston. The analysis of the agency suggests
that ABCD has neither the fiscal structure, nor the
staff on board that would allow it to fulfill such a
committment.
An alternative to this problem would be for ABCD
to establish a corporate body for the purpose of oper-
ating economic development ventures in Mattapan.
Since the agency wants to promote community economic
development, the corporation would need to be comprised
of a majority of Mattapan residents. For ABCD to es-
tablish another corporation in Mattapan with a focus
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similar to existing organizations could prove to be
counter-productive. If the agency were to attempt
to implement options 2 or 3 there are potential prob-
lems. Option 2, which would involve the establish-
ment of overlapping boards, could potentially establish
the "interconnectedness" that was discussed in
Chapter II. There are two factors which could im-
pede the immediate implementation of this strategy.
1) The agency has no formal long standing
relationship with the Mattapan community.
2) The agency had no input into the initial
development of the CDCs.
In view of this, one might question the ability and
feasibility of ABCD to exercise this option at the
onset.
The third option, that of giving the grant
to the CDC as seed money, could easily be accomodated
by ABCD's current structure. However, this goal would
not contribute to ABCD's goal of establishing an
"interconnected" relationship between the delivery
of human services and economic development activities.
Exercising this option would also prevent ABCD from
gaining the reputation and experience that would fos-
ter its efforts to achieve its longterm community
economic development goal.
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Recommendation
Based on all of these factors, this author recom-
mends that ABCD's role be a two-phased one combining
elements of options 2 and 4. The first phase would
require that ABCD hire staff skilled in community
economic development and community organizing tech-
niques, to offer assistance to the community based
organizations (CBOs). The relationship of ABCD to the
CBOs should be that of consultant; teaching the resi-
dents community economic development strategies, help-
ing them identify internal resources, and helping
them find and utilize methods to coordinate human ser-
vice delivery and community economic development activ-
ities. The ultimate objective would be to create a
situation of resident self-sufficiency. It is impor-
tant that ABCD maintain this objective since there is
no guarantee that the agency will have future financial
support for economic development activities.
Phase II involves the establishment of a formal
network between the residents involved in the economic
development activities, and those involved in the human
service programs that ABCD will put in place in Matta-
pan.
This type of relationship would bring several
benefits to both the Mattapan community and ABCD.
The residents would have:
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1) the right to self-determination,
2) staff with the expertise to help them con-
vert their ideas into action,
3) the benefit of the influence of power of
ABCD, and
4) a comprehensive program to meet its needs.
Alternatively, ABCD would gain:
1) a track record in community economic devel-
opment, and
2) skills and experience which are transfera-
ble to other low-income areas.
In terms of a long term strategy for ABCD, the
agency should give serious thought to continuing to
play the role of a technical assistant to CBOs and
residents in need of such assistance. According to
CCED, there is a void in this field that needs to be
filled. With greater numbers of CBOs becoming involved
in community economic development a greater drain is
made on the existing resources, both monetary and
human. At the Massachusetts Conference on Community
Economic Development in 1975, the conference organizers
were constantly asked why community based groups did
not have the staff and technical capability to under-
take economic development activity. There appeared
to be a lack of knowledge among groups interested
in community economic development of where and what
kind of resources were available on a local, regional
and statewide level to meet the information, technical
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assistance and training needs of CBOs.
To perform the function of a technical assistant,
ABCD would need to hire full-time staff who are skilled
in economic development. The agency should therefore
consider establishing a legally separate body which
would have more funding source options than ABCD
presently has.
Because of its power base and experiences in
dealing with the poor, the power structure, the public
sector and the private sector, ABCD has the potential
to play a very strong role not only in the economic
development of Mattapan, but also throughout low-
income communities in Boston.
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CHAPTER IV
Footnotes
1The amount and type of resources needed depends on
the degree and type of involvement in community
economic development.
2 Carl Sussman and Stephen Klein, "Community Economic
Development and the States" (Cambridge, Mass.:
Center for Community Economic Development, 1978)
p. 8.
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1979-1980
MATTAPAN
NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION STRATEGY
Project Components
HOUSING
* Housing Improvement Program: cash rebates
(20-50% of cost) available to low-moderate
income home owners for home improvement
repairs $ 200,000
* Wellington Hill Urban Homesteading Program:
promotes home ownership for individuals
who meet "sweat equity" and financing re-
quirements; involves properties in ineed
of serious rehabilitation 90,000
0 Morton/Gallivan Housing Development:
replace and repair wood siding 30,000
e Groveland Elderly Housing Development:
roofing repairs 50,000
* Demolition and Boarding: for the boarding
of potentially sound buildings and the
demolition of unsalvageable structures 65,000
0 Mattapan Neighborhood Marketing Program:
neighborhood confidence, marketing and
image-improvement project 50,000
COMMERCIAL REVITALIZATION
* Mattapan Square Amenities: street furniture,
marketing aids and signs for the Mattapan
Square business district 10,000
CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS
e Parks and Recreation
Trees, various locations 8,400
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* Skimcoating
Astoria Street, Flint Street to end
Colorado Street, Mattapan Street to
Monterey Street
Colorado Street, Monterey Street to
Cummins Highway
Mattapan Street, Fottler Road to Blue
Hill Avenue
Woolson Street, Blue Hill Avenue to
Norfolk Street
Astoria Street, Elizabeth Street to
Walter Playground
e Lighting
Leston Street Lighting (Poles only)
Woolson Street Lighting (Poles only)
Hosmer Street Lights (Poles only)
* Sidewalk Reconstruction
Astoria Street, Flint Street to end
Astoria Street, Elizabeth Street to
Walker Playground
Hillsboro Street, Hazelton Street to
Ormond Street
Hillsboro Street, Ormond-Wellington Hill W.
only
Hosmer Street, Blue Hill Avenue-Norfolk St.
Idaho Street, River Street to Manchester
Street
Leston Street, Woolson Street to Morton
Street
Woolson Street, Blue Hill Avenue-Norfolk
Street
$ 9,000
18,000
18,000
8,000
12,000
4, 500
17,000
24,000
20,000
45,000
22 , 500
50,000
16,250
85,000
65,000
72,250
102,000
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0 Public Facilities
Renovations to Elderly Center, Mattapan
Chronic Disease Hospital $ 50,000
Foley Building electrical system,
Mattapan Chronic Disease Hospital 350,000
* Traffic and Parking
Itasca Street Speed Bump/Sign 60,000
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES
* Mattapan Youth Athletic Club: youth
athletic program in Almont Park 9,000
* Youth Activities Commission: provides
neighborhood youth workers in the
evenings (5:00 p.m. to midnight) 12,000
* Mattapan Health Center: pediatric,
obstetrical, gynecological, and
dental services 50,000
* Mattahunt Community School After-school
Reading Program: reading, counselling
and skill development for elementary
school children 18,000
* Mattahunt Community School After-school
Day Care Program 15,500
0 CB Security Patrol: neighborhood security
patrol operated by the District 3 Community
Council, in coordination with the Boston
Police Department 15,500
0 Senior Shuttle 22,000
IMPROVEMENTS TO NON-PROFIT FACILITIES
e Mattapan Health Center: site acquisition and
rehabilitation 100,000
WELLINGTON HILL CONCENTRATED INVESTMENT AREA
e CIA Specific Activities
Urban Homesteading Program (90,000)
Demolition and Boarding (65,000)
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* Neighborhood-wide activities which directly
support the CIA strategy
Housing Improvement Program
Mattapan Neighborhood Marketing Program
Mattapan Health Center
CB Security Patrol
TOTAL MATTAPAN NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION PROGRAM $1,793,900
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